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Abstract
There are many existing studies characterizing the informal sector in Latin America, but
the literature fails to fully examine the interactions between gender and disadvantaging
factors on the probability of informal employment and its returns to wage. This analysis
uses survey data from Argentina (2001) and Uruguay (2006) to examine the
heterogeneous effects of number of children under 5, education, minority status, and
migrant status on male and female informal employment and income. Being female
interacts with number of children under 5 to create no effect on probability of informal
employment, in contrast to a significant negative effect for men. Education has a greater
negative effect on probability of informal work for females, while minority status and
migrant status have a greater positive effect on the probability of being employed
informally for females. Additionally, working informally is associated with a negative
effect on wage for both females and males, but this effect is less for females. Number of
children under 5 also negatively affects female wages, while there is no such effect for
men.
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1. Introduction
In most developing countries, the informal sector is an integral, if not the largest,
segment of the economy, characterized by individuals working in small-scale, lowproductivity jobs (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2009). The informal sector primarily
includes mostly poor workers, and participation in this sector is often associated with
“low and volatile earnings,” meaning that informal workers are often making less than
the formal sector and have a less-than-steady stream of income (Gunther and Launov,
2012). Although scholars debate whether the relationship between informal work and
income is causal (Maloney, 2004), there is a strong link between informal employment
and poverty. This has made the informal sector a significant subject of research for those
who are interested in poverty reduction (Beccaria and Groisman, 2008), entrepreneurship
(Maloney, 2004), or policy changes to enable personal and economic growth (Chen,
2001).
There has been significant past research in measuring and defining the informal
sectors of developing countries, specifically in Latin America. In a comprehensive
analysis of the informal sectors of multiple Central American countries, Funkhouser
(1996) finds that the informal sector is “the youngest, the oldest, the least educated, and
female.” Funkhouser also finds a high return to education on income and a higher maleto-female earnings differential in the informal sector than the formal sector. However, he
finds that the disproportionate employment of women in the informal sector coupled with
the lower earnings differential suggests that there are significant barriers to mobility
within this sector for women.
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Past research has looked at the informal sectors of Argentina and Uruguay
specifically but has not deeply analyzed the influence of factors within their female
populations, at most analyzing only the simple variable of gender on informal
employment. Portes et. al. (1986) find that, at their time of research, the Uruguayan
informal sector encompassed 20% of their survey respondents, and that the probability of
informal employment was additionally influenced by race and sex, not just skill.
Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) found that the share of informal workers in the overall
labor force in Argentina between 1995 and 2005 ranged between 41% and 46%, while
proportion of informal workers from the adult female population ranged from 40% to
45%. In Uruguay, they found that the informal share of the workforce ranged from 35%
in 1992 to 44% in 2003, with adult female proportions of 43% in 1995 and 1998 and 51%
in 2003. Beccaria and Groisman (2008) find that Argentinian informal employees earn
only 60% to 70% of income comparted to formal sector employees, suggesting a close
relationship between the informal sector and poverty. However, they do not analyze the
impact of gender within this sector.
Funkhouser (1996) does include interaction variables of gender and other qualities
in his analysis of several Central American countries, but he focuses on the effects of the
interaction between gender and marital status and its effect on the probability of informal
employment. He also focuses on the earnings differential between men and women in the
informal sector, noting that it is much larger than that of the formal sector, and states that
this, compiled with disproportionate female employment in the informal sector found in
his analysis, “suggests that barriers to mobility, and refuge employment in the informal
sector, may be important for females.” Funkhouser does not look at the effects of other
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potentially disadvantaging qualities and their interactions with gender to affect the
probability of informal employment, despite the possibility that additional interaction
variables could be significant in a similar analysis and help characterize the role of
intersectionality in informal sector employment. Overall, the economic research that I
was able to find did not delve far beyond the simple effect of only being female on the
propensity to be informally employed.
The lack of nuance within the female portions of these analyses on informal
employment suggests that there is room for further economic research on the
compounding effects of gender and other disadvantaging factors in choosing informal
work and the returns to income through this sector. Women are disproportionately
employed in the informal sector globally, and informal sector work and poverty are often
intertwined (Chen 2001). The concept of intersectionality suggests that gender can
interact with other variables that characterize many informal sector employees, such as
race and low education, to generate additional disadvantage and higher propensity of
low-income, informal employment. Researchers in the fields of sociology and political
science have examined women’s participation in the informal sector in Latin America
and attempted to examine the influences of individual and societal characteristics on the
structure of the informal and formal labor markets (Cantu, 2017; Sautu 1980; Chen
2001). Evidence of compounding effects between gender and other characteristics on the
individual level can contribute to the current debate surrounding the nature of informal
work and whether women are choosing to be employed in the informal sector, or
confined by barriers to the formal sector.
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Heterogeneity of the informal sector is often emphasized in existing literature.
Although this study attempts to identify trends and causal factors on informal
employment and income, the informal sector in Latin America is not a homogenous
block. In the past, the informal sector was characterized as individuals seeking insecure
jobs as their only option to unemployment. However, recent research has emphasized that
there is evidence of a more entrepreneurial portion of the informal sector (Caneiro, 2009;
Maloney, 2004). Although the simple metric of informal/formal employment does not
capture the nuance of the informal sector, evidence of intersectionality between gender
and other disadvantaging characteristics in predicting informal employment can be
indicative of barriers that exist to formal employment to these groups. Additionally,
evidence of wage premiums for informal employees of certain groups could help shed
light on whether these groups are voluntarily remaining informal sector employees.
This study finds evidence of heterogeneous effects of the number of young
children, education, and minority and migrant status on females compared to males on
probability of informal employment. Although males are more likely to work in the
formal sector for each additional child under the age of 5, additional children under the
age of 5 has no impact on the probability of informal work for women. The impact of a
year of education, additionally, has almost double the negative impact on the probability
of being informally employed on females compared to males. There is a significant
impact of being a minority on the female population in increasing the probability of
informal work, while there is an opposite or no effect for men. Migrant women are much
more likely to be informally employed than migrant men by a gap of approximately 12
percentage points.
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Additionally, this study finds that number of young children and participation in
the informal sector have different effects on female income than on male income. Being
an informal worker has a downward effect on wage for both men and women, but the
effect is of a lesser magnitude for females. The interaction of being female and number of
children under 5 has an additional negative penalty to wage, while number of children
under 5 has no effect on men. The interactions between being female and minority status,
as well as being female and migrant status, have no significant impact on wage. Minority
status on its own, however, has a significant negative effect on income for both males and
females.
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2. Methods and Data
2.1 Methods
This study begins with several two-sample t-tests on differences between the male
and female samples and the informal and formal worker samples. These simple means
tests serve the purpose of identifying interesting trends, but other factors influence the
probability of being informally employed. The study then moves to several OLS
multivariate regression analyses in which the variables of interest are examined in the
entire sample, in gender-separated samples, and in the entire sample with their
interactions on gender included.
2.2 Data
The data used in this study are from the 2001 Argentina National Population,
Households, and Dwellings Census (NPHDC), conducted by the National Institute of
Statistics and Censuses, and the 2006 Uruguay Extended National Survey of Homes
(ENHA), a probability sample conducted by the National Institute of Statistics. Both were
accessed through the IPUMS International user database. The entire NPHDC dataset
reflects 3,883,969 individuals, and the ENHA contains information on 256,866
individuals. These studies, while not the most recent available censuses, were chosen on
the basis that they included information on the size of place of employment, a key
variable used to define inclusion in the informal sector. Both studies contain information
on, among other variables, age, sex, marital status, educational attainment by year and by
level, native-born status, head of household, and industry of employment. The NPHDC
additionally contains information on country of birth, and the ENHA contains
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information on race, indigenous status, and income. Due to the nature of the samples, not
every respondent includes a response for each variable.
2.3 Variable Definitions
This study uses categorization of workers by the “productivity” definition of the
informal sector outlined in Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) to define the informal sector:
Individuals are considered a part of the informal sector if he or she is unskilled
self-employed, a salaried worker in a small private firm, or a zero income worker.
This definition is consistent with the reasoning used in other microeconomic studies on
the informal sector (Funkhouser 1996; Henley & Arabsheibani 2008). In this definition,
unskilled self-employment implies that the individual is both not working for a wellestablished, productive firm and that he or she does not have superior education
necessary to work as a professional or technician. According to Gasparini and Tornarolli
(2009), small firms are often run by those who are self-employed, and are usually using
primitive technology and operating at low productivity, which are considered defining
characteristics of informal labor. The number cutoff in identifying small places of
employment for the purpose of identifying informal workers can range depending on the
survey, but are often defined as having 5 employees or less (Caneiro, 2009; Funkhouser,
1996). Due to differences in survey questions, small places of employment are defined as
having between 1-5 employees in Argentina and 1-4 employees in Uruguay. The variable
in the data that contains the size of work establishment includes only private sector
employees and persons age 14 and over for both NHPDC and ENHA. Additionally,
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skilled self-employment is implied if the individual has a tertiary degree; those who have
completed university are, therefore, classified as formal workers.
Zero-income work, according to Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009), often indicates
that the person works in a family-based enterprise and receives non-monetary
compensation and other non-formal payment. This data set uses information on monthly
income, in which zero-income work can also indicate the wage volatility that is often
associated with informal employment. Because of this, a response of “0” for last month’s
income indicates informal employment. Individuals meeting criteria to be classified
within one of these three defining categories are indicated as an informal worker in the
variable Informal (Inf).
Labor force non-participants are removed from this metric. Labor force
participation is determined in the NPHDC by asking if the individual either worked last
week, or if they were looking for work in the last four weeks. Text information for the
question on labor force participation in the ENHA was unavailable and unclear exactly
what methodology was used to determine labor force participation from the survey;
however, I assume that it was likely determined through indicators similar to those used
in the NPHDC, as surveys often determine labor force participation through whether the
individual worked or is looking for work.1 For the purpose of simply excluding those
who do not work from the informality metric, which is determined mostly by size of

For example, the Uruguay 2011 census asks, “During the past week, did (Name) work for at least an
hour? Did the [the respondent] do something outside the household, or helped in a business or collaborated
in the care of animals, crops, or gardens that were not for self-consumption? Even though [the respondent]
didn't work last week, does [the respondent] have some work or business that [the respondent] will surely
return to? During the last four weeks, was [the respondent] looking for work or trying to establish a
business?” The Uruguay 1996 census asks, “During the past week, did you work at least one hour?”
1
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place of work, I chose to continue to use the ENHA labor force variable to define
informal and formal workers.
Other variables of interest to be interacted with gender and control variables are a
female dummy (Female or F), number of children under 5 years (Children Under 5 or
N5), age, education in terms of years of schooling (Years of School or Yrs) and
educational level attainment (primary school, secondary school, etc.), race (Minority or
Min), migration status (Migrant or Mig), head of household status, and income (Income
or Inc). Number of children under 5 years reflects the number of the individual’s own
children that are under the age of 5.
Race, a variable available only from the ENHA, has been constructed into the
dummy variable Minority, which indicates 0 as the Uruguayan racial majority (white) and
indicates 1 as a non-white racial minority, including those of two or more races. Migrant
is a dummy variable constructed from data on whether or not the person is a native, 1
indicating that they did not immediately live in their country of residence after birth.
Information on migration was only collected during the 4th trimester of the ENHA
survey, so the number of responses to the variable Migrant are limited in Uruguay.
Income data is also only available from the ENHA, and reflects the total amount
of income earned for that individual from their highest-paying job last month in
Uruguayan pesos. The conversion rate of Uruguayan pesos to dollars on December 31,
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2006 was 24.37 pesos to 1 dollar,2 which is used to contextualize the results with an
approximate dollar value.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1A

VARIABLES
Children under 5
Age
Yrs of School
Wage last month
(Uruguayan pesos)
Racial Minority
Migrant
Head of HH
Informal

Summary: Entire Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
N
Mean
SD

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

3,883,969
3,883,969
3,682,864
256,866

0.160
31.60
7.376
1,659

0.472
22.23
4.668
4,261

0
0
0
0

9
100
18
180,000

255,978
3,690,112
3,883,969
729,096

0.126
0.0419
0.281
0.506

0.332
0.200
0.450
0.500

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Table 1B
Summary: Included in Informal Metric
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
VARIABLES
N
Mean
SD
Min
Children under 5
Age
Yrs of School
Wage last month
(Uruguayan pesos)
Racial Minority
Migrant
Head of HH
Informal

2

(5)
Max

729,096
729,096
729,091
93,146

0.260
37.79
9.536
3,146

0.564
13.57
3.950
5,342

0
15
0
0

7
99
18
180,000

92,824
659,692
729,096
729,096

0.119
0.0584
0.505
0.506

0.323
0.235
0.500
0.500

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

The historical conversion rate was found on www.xe.com/currencytables.
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Table 1A displays the summary statistics for the entire combined sample of
NPHDC and ENHA, while Table 1B contains the same summary statistics for the smaller
sample of only those who do not have a “missing” value for the variable Informal. This is
the sample used in the majority of analyses in this study. Several means change in the
second table; the average number of children under five, age, average years of school,
average wage last month, and proportion that are head of household all increase.
However, these changes are all likely due to the removal of children under the age of 14
from the informality metric. The proportion of racial minorities in the sample decreases
by 0.7 percentage points, or 5.55%, and the proportion of migrants as a share of the
sample increases by 1.65 percentage points, or 39.38%. When a t-test is run on these
differences in proportions, they are both found to be significant at the 1% level. 3
Because the proportion of racial minorities only changes by around 5%, the
magnitude of this change is not very concerning. However, the proportion of migrants in
the sample increases by quite a large amount, becoming over a third larger. One possible
reason for this increase is that migrants in the sample may tend to be working adults
rather than children, so a smaller proportion of migrants compared to natives are removed
from the sample when it is restricted to those who work in the informality metric. When a
t-test is run on the average ages of the migrant sample versus the native sample, we find
that the migrant sample is significantly older by an average of 18.17 years.4 This implies
that a higher proportion of the migrant population is in the labor force, and less migrants

3
4

Results of this t-test are shown in Appendix Table 1.
Results of this t-test are shown in Appendix Table 2.
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are removed when the sample is restricted to this metric. This explains why this
proportion of migrants in the informality metric is significantly higher.
Table 2
Proportions of All, Male, and Female workers in each industry by informal/formal sector
All
Male
Female
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
Informal
Formal
Informal
Formal
Informal Formal

Agriculture, Fishing,
Forestry
Mining

16.15

7.82

24.54

10.00

5.37

3.06

0.14

0.85

0.23

1.14

0.02

0.22

Manufacturing

9.40

20.98

12.38

24.45

5.58

13.38

Electricity, gas, water

0.33

1.56

0.48

1.86

0.13

0.89

Construction

5.18

4.39

9.05

6.09

0.22

0.65

Wholesale and Retail
Trade
Hotels and
Restaurants
Transportation,
storage, and
communication
Financial services
and insurance
Public administration
and defense
Real estate and
business services
Education

23.39

17.05

26.62

16.61

19.25

18.01

3.29

3.98

3.15

3.48

3.47

5.06

5.59

10.42

8.66

12.96

1.65

4.85

0.54

3.29

0.49

2.75

0.59

4.48

0.02

0.06

0.01

0.04

0.02

0.11

4.82

8.35

4.84

7.74

4.80

9.68

0.81

5.61

0.30

1.71

1.47

14.17

Health and social
work
Other services

1.63

6.01

0.49

2.76

3.10

13.14

4.54

4.60

4.60

4.28

4.45

5.30

Private household
services

21.15

.45

1.52

.21

46.36

0.97
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Table 2 shows the proportion of workers in each industry by gender and
formal/informal sector. Almost half of women working in the informal sector (46.36%)
are working in private household services, which is consistent with literature on labor
markets of Latin American countries—women typically have the “worst” jobs in the
informal sector, working in “precarious” domestic or household work, often for little or
no payment (Abramo and Valenzuela, 2005). In contrast, the highest proportions of males
working in the informal sector are working in wholesale and retail trade and agriculture.
Small portions of informal workers are in industries that would often be
considered formal lines of work, such as financial services and insurance, or public
administration and defense. There are several explanations for why these workers could
be considered informal: first, since an important aspect of the construction of the
informality variable is simply the size of the place of employment, it is possible that
several individuals working in small, formal places of employment are considered
informal in this sample; second, the way that industry is determined in the sample is
through the individual’s description of their job, where it is then categorized into the
assumed industry—it is possible that a disconnect between job description and actual job
function led some individuals to be classified in a “formal” industry when they are not;
lastly, individuals working in these sectors may still be informal, but may be subcontractors to the formal sector (Funkhouser, 1996).
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3. Analysis
3.1 Informality: Two-Sample Means Tests
This study begins analysis with a series of two-sample means tests between the
male/female and native/migrant samples. Each test is testing against the null
hypothesis that the means of the male and female samples or the native and migrant
samples for that variable are equal.
Table 3A
T-test results for male & female mean comparisons
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Male Mean
Female
Difference
Mean
Percent informal

.456

.589

Percent informal if
migrant
Percent informal if
minority
Yrs of school if
informal

.444

.725

.625

.714

8.181

8.569

10.100

12.169

Yrs of school if
formal

-.132***
(.001)
-.281***
(.005)
-.088***
(.009)
-.388***
(.012)
-2.069***
(.014)

Table 3A shows the results of several t-tests comparing differences between the
male and female populations. The differences between males and females for each
variable above is significant at the one-percent level.
Overall, the proportion of women working in the informal sector is much greater
than the proportion of men, with women being 13.2 percentage points, or 28.9%, more
likely to be an informal worker. When looking at the migrant population, this difference
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more than doubles, with migrant women being 28.1 percentage points, or 63.3%, more
likely to be an informal worker than migrant men. This is driven by the large proportion
of the female migrant population working in the informal sector, in which it jumps to
72.5% of migrant women from 58.9% of all women.
There are several possible reasons why migrant women may be more inclined to
work in the informal sector than migrant men. First, women’s reasons for migrating often
center on their desire to better their family more than helping themselves (Pedraza 1991),
which may lead them to be more accepting of “undesirable” jobs. Additionally, migrant
women may lack language skills or years of schooling to compete with natives for formal
sector jobs. To shed more light on this second hypothesis, Table 3B analyzes the
difference in education between migrant and non-migrant female populations in this
sample.
Table 3B
T-test results for years of school between natives and migrants
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Native Mean
Migrant
Difference
Mean
Females

10.247

9.116

Males

9.363

8.957

1.135***
(.032)
.406***
(.0274)

Note: The tests in this table are restricted to only individuals with a value for the informality metric.

The results in Table 3B show that native females have, on average, 1.135 more
years of schooling than migrant females, and native males have, on average, 0.406 more
years of schooling than migrant males. For both males and females, migrants have lower
education than natives, but this trend is of a greater magnitude for females. Because
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migrant women experience a greater educational gap compared to natives than their male
counterparts, they may be facing more educational barriers to entering the formal sector,
while migrant men may not have the same barriers.
In Table 3A, a similar trend appears when analyzing the difference between male
and female minority workers. 71.4% of minority female workers are informal workers,
again much higher than the overall proportion of women informal workers at 58.9%.
However, in contrast to the proportion of male migrant workers, which was almost the
same as the overall proportion of men in the informal sector, the proportion of minority
men working in the informal sector is greater than the overall proportion of men in the
informal sector at 62.5% compared to 45.6%. The difference between the proportions of
minority female and male informal workers is then only an 8.8 percentage point
difference, which is smaller than the gap between the overall populations of men and
women. This suggests that being a racial minority affects men and women in similar
ways, and has similar effects on the propensity to work in the informal sector. These
differences suggest that there may be either racial discrimination in the formal workplace,
creating a barrier to entry for minorities, or that racial minorities have other
disadvantages that lead them to seek informal employment.
In the informal sector, males and females have similar levels of schooling at 8.181
years and 8.569 years of schooling, respectively. In contrast, men in the formal sector
have, on average, 10.1 years of schooling, and women in the formal sector have 12.169
years of schooling. Both male and female informal workers have, typically, no secondary
education, while male and female formal workers have at least some high school
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education. However, the average female formal worker has a high school diploma, while
the average male formal worker has only a few years of high school. This suggests that
the educational barrier for entry into the formal sector may be higher for women,
providing a possible explanation for why there is a greater proportion of women
employed in the informal sector.
To explore this idea of different educational barriers in the formal sector for males
and females, Table 3C shows the difference in informal sector participation at different
educational milestones.
Table 3C
T-test results for informal participation by sex and education
level
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Male Mean
Female
Difference
Mean
Zero Schooling

.590

.841

Less than Primary

.602

.820

Primary Completed

.509

.752

Secondary Completed

.401

.463

-.251***
(.008)
-.218***
(.003)
-.243***
(.002)
-.062***
(.002)

For all milestones of education below “Secondary Completed,” women are
significantly more likely than men to be working in the informal sector. Once primary
school is completed, both men and women become slightly less likely to work in the
informal sector, but the drop in probability is greater for men than women, causing the
gap between percentage of males and females in the informal sector to rise to a 24.3
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percentage point, or 47.7%, difference. However, once secondary school is completed,
this gap greatly narrows to a 6.2 percentage point difference, and women become only
15.5% more likely to be working in the informal sector. This provides evidence for the
idea that women have more barriers to working in the informal sector than men if they
have less than a high school education.
3.2 Informality: Regression Analysis
Table 4 includes the results from several multivariate regressions of the control
variables on the probability of being an informal worker. The regressions include either
minority status, migrant status, or both in order to showcase the difference in coefficients
within the varying sample sizes created by the availability of the variables Minority and
Migrant. The three regressions are modeled by the equations:
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(3) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃 ′ is a vector containing the control
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.
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Table 4
Dependent variable: Informal=1, both genders
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Minority
Migrant
Minority &
Included
Included
Migrant
Female
0.0807***
0.148***
0.0774***
(0.00355)
(0.00135)
(0.00704)
Children under 5
-0.00172
-0.0188***
-0.0145**
(0.00342)
(0.00108)
(0.00694)
Yrs of School
-0.0352***
-0.0358***
-0.0345***
(0.000453)
(0.000156)
(0.000915)
Minority
0.00442
0.00287
(0.00466)
(0.00926)
Migrant
0.0771***
0.0361*
(0.00250)
(0.0214)
Constant
0.684***
0.689***
0.663***
(0.00757)
(0.00341)
(0.0151)
Observations
R-squared

92,819
659,690
0.133
0.135
Standard errors in parentheses

23,732
0.132

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The individuals in the Uruguay sample are 10.4% more likely to be informal
workers, controlling for all other variables.5 This suggests that there are likely structural
qualities about the country of Uruguay that influence formal work opportunities and
barriers for the entire population, but these qualities may be harder to observe or define in
a household survey. Additionally, the coefficients for many provinces when controlling
for location fixed effects are quite large, suggesting that there may be several omitted or
unobserved variables relating to residents of different provinces.
For each of the analyses, female has a positive coefficient of at least .077,

Full results of the regressions in Table 4, including a regression using “country” as a control in place of
province fixed effects, are shown in Appendix Table 3. Full results of the regressions in Tables 5A and 5B
are shown in Appendix Tables 4 and 5.
5
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meaning that being female reasonably increases the probability of being an informal
employee. This is in line with previous research, which has found that females are more
likely to be working in the informal sector (Funkhouser, 1996; Henley and Arabshibani,
2008; Portes et. al., 1986). Each year of school is associated with a lower probability of
working informally, which is in line with past research that finds that the informal sector
tends to be less educated (Funkhouser, 1996; Portes et. al., 1986).
Being a racial minority does not significantly influence informal sector
probability when included as a variable on its own in the total regression. Being a
migrant, when on its own, is positively associated with an increase in probability of being
an informal worker but, when minority status is also controlled for, becomes significant
only at the 10% level. Also, when only minority status is controlled for, number of
children under 5 no longer becomes significant, but becomes significant at the 5% level
once migrant status is controlled for.
Tables 5A and 5B show the results of similar regressions to Table 4, but
separately on the male and female samples to isolate the effects of the variables on the
genders separately. The regressions are represented by the equations:
(4) (7) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β3 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(5) (8) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(6) (9) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β3 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃 ′ is a vector containing the control
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.
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Table 5A

VARIABLES

Dependent variable: Informal=1, Males
(4)
(5)
Minority
Migrant
Included
Included

Children under 5
Yrs of School
Minority

-0.00147
(0.00449)
-0.0272***
(0.000616)
-0.00167
(0.00617)

0.600***
(0.00975)

0.0206***
(0.00341)
0.613***
(0.00438)

-0.0139
(0.00914)
-0.0269***
(0.00125)
0.00165
(0.0122)
0.0323
(0.0298)
0.582***
(0.0194)

55,450
0.103

413,204
0.081

14,132
0.106

Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.0150***
(0.00133)
-0.0266***
(0.000203)

(6)
Minority &
Migrant

Table 5B
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females
(7)
(8)
(9)
VARIABLES
Minority
Migrant
Minority &
Included
Included
Migrant
Children under 5
Yrs of School
Minority

0.00416
(0.00525)
-0.0460***
(0.000659)
0.0144**
(0.00703)

0.893***
(0.0119)

0.141***
(0.00356)
0.994***
(0.00529)

-0.00906
(0.0107)
-0.0448***
(0.00133)
0.00338
(0.0140)
0.0315
(0.0301)
0.864***
(0.0241)

37,369
0.189

246,486
0.216

9,600
0.182

Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.0170***
(0.00188)
-0.0504***
(0.000239)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For females, the number of children becomes insignificant when controlling for
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migrant and minority status, a trend also seen in the male sample but not in the sample
with both genders. Years of school for females remains significant at a greater magnitude
than for males; each increase of one year of education is associated with a 4.48
percentage point drop in probability of being an informal worker for females, while it is
only associated with a 2.69 percentage point drop in probability for males.
Minority has a positive effect on probability of being informally employed for
females only, increasing the probability of being informally employed by 1.44 percentage
points. Migrant has a significant effect on the probability of being informally employed
for both men and women, but while migrant men experience only a 2.06 percentage point
increase in probability, women experience a staggering 14.1 percentage point increase in
the probability of being informally employed.
For both males and females, neither minority nor migrant status becomes
significant once both are controlled for. These effects, however, are likely due to the
changes in sample size and inclusion of only individuals in Uruguay.6
Table 6 presents the results of four regressions on the probability of being
informally employed, each with the inclusion of an interaction variable. The regressions
are represented by the following equations:

6

(10)

𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖

(11)

𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖

(12)

𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖

See Appendix Table 7 for results of regression on the restricted sample.
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(13)

𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖

where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃 ′ is a vector containing the control
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.
Table 6 includes the regressions for the entire applicable samples, but includes
interaction variables for crosses between gender and number of children under 5, years of
school, minority status, and migrant status. The interaction variables are separated in
order to isolate the effects in the different sample sizes.
In this set of regressions, each interaction variable is significant at the 1% level.
For number of children under 5, minority status, and migrant status, the coefficients are
positive, suggesting that the interaction between being female and these variables
increase an individual’s probability of being employed in the informal sector. For the
interaction between female and years of school, the coefficient is negative.
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Table 6

VARIABLES

Female
Children Under 5
Yrs of School
Female*N5

Dependent Variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions
(10)
(11)
(12)
Children
Education
Minority
Interaction
Interaction
Interaction
0.139***
(0.00135)
-0.0240***
(0.00122)
-0.0360***
(0.000149)
0.0227***
(0.00216)

Female*Yrs School

0.368***
(0.00306)
-0.0164***
(0.00104)
-0.0271***
(0.000184)

0.0759***
(0.00374)
-0.00174
(0.00342)
-0.0352***
(0.000453)

-0.0106*
(0.00593)
0.0382***
(0.00931)

Female*Minority
Migrant

0.686***
(0.00758)

0.0211***
(0.00330)
0.128***
(0.00493)
0.688***
(0.00341)

92,819
0.133

659,690
0.135

Female*Migrant

Observations
R-squared

0.140***
(0.00138)
-0.0187***
(0.00108)
-0.0356***
(0.000156)

-0.0229***
(0.000283)

Minority

Constant

(13)
Migrant
Interaction

0.693***
(0.00327)

0.613***
(0.00339)

729,091
729,091
0.139
0.147
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first regression in Table 6 shows that the coefficient on Children Under 5
has a significant negative effect of 2.4 percentage points on the probability of working
informally, while Female*N5 has a significant positive effect of 2.27 percentage points.
This means that, for males, each additional child under 5 decreases their probability of
informal employment by 2.4 percentage points, while, for females, the effect is canceled
out and the net effect of each child under 5 on the probability of being informally
employed is -0.13 percentage points. When we compare this result to the female-only
regression in Table 5B, the effect of Children Under 5 is not significant, indicating no
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effect. This is surprising considering that, since women are typically the caretakers of
small children, we might expect children to have a larger effect on employment decisions
like formal or informal employment. However, this difference in coefficients may reflect
that men have greater opportunity to move into the formal sector if they have more small
children, whereas women lack this option. This could also be indicative of genderdefined barriers that exist for mothers of small children, that they have greater obstacles
for seeking more stable forms of employment than fathers of small children.
For each additional year of schooling, the male probability of being an informal
worker decreases by 2.7 percentage points. For females, this effect is even greater, with
the coefficient on the Female*Years of School interaction term decreasing a woman’s
probability of being informally employed by an additional 2.3 percentage points. This net
effect is that for each year of schooling, a woman’s probability of being informally
employed decreases by a total of 5 percentage points, a rather large effect. This shows
that education level has a greater influence on which sector women work in than men,
which supports the hypothesis considered earlier that women have greater educational
barriers to entering the formal sector. As presented earlier, the mean education level of a
female worker in the formal sector is 2.07 years greater than the mean education level of
a male worker in the formal sector. Women with lower levels of education are either not
selecting formal employment or limited in their opportunities. However, this coefficient
also showcases the potential that increasing education has for expanding ability to enter
the formal sector.
It is possible that formal sector employers may place higher standards when hiring
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women, expecting them to have completed their secondary education, on average, to
perform the job while not upholding the same standard for men. It is also possible that the
types of the jobs in the formal sector that are more accessible to women require a higher
level of education. As seen in Table 2, which displays the proportions of men and women
working in different industries in the informal and formal sectors, the most frequent
industry of employment for men in the formal sector is overwhelmingly manufacturing,
capturing 24.45% of the male formal workforce. Formally employed women are around
as likely to work in the education (14.17%) and health and social work (13.14%)
industries as they are to work in manufacturing (13.38%), and they are most likely to
work in wholesale and retail trade (18.01%). Because the education and health and social
work sectors often require a higher level of education, or at least a secondary degree, this
could help explain why education increases the probability of formal sector work more
for women, and why it appears that women have more educational barriers to entering the
formal sector.
It is unclear whether two of the types of industries that formally employed males
typically work in—1. manufacturing and 2. transportation, storage, and communication—
are less popular for women because women are excluded from these industries or that
women choose not to work in these sectors. It is likely that it is a combination; both of
these industries typically involve more physical labor than the sectors that formal female
employees typically work in. For some women, an informal job that has fewer physical
demands may be preferred to a more physically demanding formal sector job.
Conversely, employers in the manufacturing and transportation, storage, and
communication industries may judge women as being unfit for physical jobs, and societal
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norms of industry gender roles may prevent women from seeking employment in these
sectors in the first place.
The effect of being a minority on informal employment for men is negative,
which is not the expected sign. However, it is relatively small, decreasing the probability
by only 1 percentage point, and significant at only the 10% level. Minority was not
significant when regressed in the male-only sample, so it is likely that this effect is weak.
For women, however, this effect is much larger, positive, and significant at the 1% level.
Females that are non-white have a net increase of 2.8 percentage points on the probability
of informal employment, while men do not share this same trend. To test the robustness
of this result, I ran a regression where the interaction variable between female and years
of school is also included. The effect of the interaction between female and minority
status remains around the same level and significant at the 5% level.7
Minority status may affect women differently because racial discrimination may
exacerbate existing barriers to entry that women already experience to formal sector
entry. Prejudice against racial minorities could also affect the way that they are hired for
jobs that require secondary school completion, which likely make up many of the jobs in
the formal sectors that women are most frequently employed in.
For the interaction of gender on migrant status, the results from Table 6 are
almost the same as in the male and female split regressions in Tables 5A and 5B. Both
the coefficients of Migrant and Female*Migrant are their expected sign, positive, and
significant at the 1% level. While migrant men experience only a 2.11 percentage point

7

Results from this regression are shown in Appendix Table 9.
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increase in probability of being informally employed (a large increase in itself), migrant
women are 14.9 percentage points more likely to be informally employed than nonmigrant women.
This result goes along with earlier mean comparisons and previous literature that
show that migrant women are more likely than non-migrants and migrant men to be
informally employed. As mentioned earlier, women often have different reasons for
migration than men, centering on betterment of their family rather than their own
personal betterment, and women typically migrate rather than men for better work
opportunities in Latin America. This may lead them to accept more precarious
employment in the informal sector, often in private household services, where there is a
high demand for labor (Cantu, 2017).8 The informal sector can serve as an opportunity
for migrant women to receive better opportunity for employment than in their home
country. However, there are also likely barriers to working in the formal sector, such as
legal working status and language, that can compound on the existing barriers that
women face from moving into the formal sector and make it difficult for migrant women
to secure formal employment. In this way, informal employment may serve as a “last
resort” for migrant women that are currently in the labor force and have few other
employment options.
3.3 Income: Regression Analysis
After looking at the interactions of gender on number of young children,

8

Female migrants in Argentina specifically are often from Paraguay and Bolivia, and the proportion of
domestic workers that are migrants in Argentina grew from 13.8% in 1995 to 40.1% after 1996 (Cantu,
2017).
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education, minority status and migrant status on probability of being informally
employed, we now turn to look at how these factors might influence wages. Table 7
shows the results of several regressions on wage of these factors, as well as the factor of
being informally employed in itself, on wage. The regressions are in the forms of:
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖2 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖2 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 +
𝛽9 𝐹𝑖 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐹𝑖 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(3) (5) (6) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖2 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 +
𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖
(4) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖2 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖

+ 𝛽9 𝐹𝑖 𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐹𝑖 𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽12 𝐹𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃 ′ 𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖

where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃 ′ is a vector containing the control
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.
Regressions 1 and 2 are run without the variable Migrant to show the coefficient
estimates in the larger sample. Regressions 3, 5, and 6 use the same model, but are run on
the total, male, and female samples, respectively, to estimate the effects of the noninteraction variables on different samples. Additionally, the samples used in these
regressions is only from the Uruguay ENHA, as wage data was not available in the
NPHDC.
Initial iterations of the regressions show a high level of heteroscedasticity. To
help remedy this, robust standard errors are used.
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Table 7
VARIABLES

Informal
Female
Number of Children
under 5
Yrs of School
Yrs of School2
Minority

Dependent Variable: Income (Uruguayan Pesos)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
With Minority With Minority With Minority
With
& Interactions
& Migrant
Interactions
-5,177***
(41.47)
-810.4***
(114.7)
69.29

-4,765***
(57.88)
-772.4***
(68.47)
16.44

-5,411***
(82.67)
-1,076***
(227.3)
175.8*

-5,395***
(82.10)

-3,723***
(74.88)

106.5

-156.0**

(38.24)
-180.1***
(28.08)
21.33***
(1.847)
-168.5***
(34.46)

(50.78)
-190.8***
(27.28)
25.13***
(1.989)
-197.6***
(48.92)

(74.34)
-175.2***
(57.04)
20.39***
(3.738)
-97.92
(69.34)
598.6
(437.1)

(104.7)
-182.6***
(55.28)
23.26***
(3.991)
-183.3*
(94.89)
960.2
(765.0)
1,710***
(114.7)
-413.0***
(124.9)
-82.98***
(31.43)
194.6
(131.5)
-923.5
(807.5)
6,177***
(224.5)

(109.9)
-279.8***
(89.81)
28.60***
(6.083)
-131.8
(95.90)
985.9
(763.0)

(78.38)
-123.9*
(67.45)
15.98***
(4.168)
-48.76
(94.98)
3.100
(262.0)

6,646***
(342.3)

4,370***
(290.9)

14,132
0.266

9,600
0.301

Female*Informal

1,697***
(58.93)
-194.9***
(67.04)
-116.9***
(15.86)
52.36
(62.93)

Female*N5
Female*YrsSchool
Female*Minority
Female*Migrant

Observations
R-squared

(6)
Females

-4,536***
(29.23)
-765.5***
(34.93)
-10.17

Migrant

Constant

(5)
Males

5,695***
(113.3)
92,819
0.263

5,890***
(109.7)

5,946***
(231.6)

92,819
23,732
23,732
0.272
0.272
0.280
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

36

Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Informal is negative in all cases and of the
magnitude of at least 3,700 Uruguayan pesos (approximately 152 dollars) per month.
This means that if an individual works in the informal sector, despite accounting for
education, number of young children, and minority and migrant status, their income is
still expected to be much lower than that of formal sector employees. This result is very
similar to past analyses on the wages of informal sector employees (Funkhouser, 1996;
Beccaria and Groisman, 2008). This reason is one of several why we care about
identifying factors that predict propensity to work in the informal sector: if women of
disadvantaged backgrounds have an increasingly higher probability of being employed in
the informal sector, they then have a much higher probability of earning lower wages. In
this analysis, being female is also associated with lower wages, which is consistent with
previous literature on male-female wage differentials (Funkhouser, 1996).
However, despite informal and female both having negative coefficients, the
coefficient on the interaction between being female and an informal worker is positive,
meaning that informally employed women have less of a wage penalty on their informal
employment than do informally employed men. This same trend can be seen in the
gender-specific regressions—the coefficient of Informal in the male regression is -5,395
pesos, while the coefficient in the female regression is of a lesser magnitude at -3,723
pesos. This could be an explanatory factor for why a higher percentage of men are
employed in the formal sector—the wage penalty for being an informal employee is
higher for men than for women, which could incentivize more men to seek employment
in the formal sector. However, the magnitude of the wage penalty is still high for women,
suggesting that there would still be an incentive for women to seek employment in the
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formal sector for higher wages. The fact that there is still a much higher proportion of
women working in the informal sector than men supports the idea that there are barriers
to women moving to formal sector work (Funkhouser, 1996).
A surprising result in these regressions is that, for each, the coefficient on years of
school is negative, significant at the 1% level. For the male and female separate
regressions, the coefficient on males is -279.8 and the coefficient on females is -123.9,
meaning that, for each additional year of school, men are expected to earn 279.8 pesos
(approximately 11.50 dollars) less per month, and women are expected to earn 123.9
pesos (approximately 5 dollars) less per month. The coefficient on years of school
squared pushes back on this trend, but only increases the coefficient by the magnitude of
around one dollar for each additional year of schooling, still leaving a rather significant
negative impact. Additionally, when looking at the interaction between being female and
years of school, the coefficient is negative when other interaction variables are controlled
for. This means that, despite separate male and female regressions showing a great
negative return to education for men, when other factors are included, women are
experiencing a greater negative return to education.
This result goes against the intuition behind investing in education. In a basic
human capital investment model, investment in an increased unit of education in the
present translates into higher earnings in the future than if no investment in education had
been made (Acemoglu). Other studies on informality and returns to education on wages
have found positive effects of increased education on income (Funkhouser, 1996; Portes
et. al. 1986). The reason why this trend is present in the data is unclear; it is theoretically
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possible, but highly unlikely, that education does not translate into higher wages in
Uruguay. It is also possible that wages are low and variable for the majority of the
population, and that this is in tandem with low average education.
If the sample is restricted to those only with 12 years of schooling or higher (a
high school diploma), the mean monthly wage becomes 4842.65 pesos and the standard
deviation becomes 8451.12 pesos. This shows that, at high levels of education, wage is
very variable. This trend is the same if the sample is restricted to those with at least 12
year of schooling and a value in the informality metric—mean wage becomes 5610.95
pesos a month while the standard deviation is 9440.16 pesos. Even among those who are
in the labor force, variation in wage is high at high levels of education, which is likely
why the model shows the effect of education to be negative. It is unclear why so many
individuals that are in the labor force have a relatively high level of education and low
earnings. Some possible explanations are that some individuals are engaged in work
where they are receiving nonmonetary compensation, or that there are many people
working only a few hours a week.
Although the number of children under 5 has no effect on wage for men, it has a
significantly negative effect on wage for women, especially once other interaction
variables are controlled for. As women tend to be primary caretakers of young children,
this result makes sense. Women who are primary caretakers of young children likely have
less time to devote to their jobs, which likely causes them to earn less per month from
work. Although this analysis does not have data on hours worked, women with young
children may be cutting their work hours to have additional time for caretaking.
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When migrant status is not controlled for, minority status has a significantly
negative effect on wage for both men and women. However, there is no significant effect
of the interaction term between being female and being a minority, suggesting that the
effect of being a minority on wage is relatively the same for both men and women. When
migrant status is included, Minority no longer becomes significant in most of the
regressions, except for the interaction regression, where Minority remains significant at
the 10% level. However, this is likely due to the change in sample when Migrant is
factored in, as this same effect takes place when the same sample is regressed without
including the variable Migrant.
Migrant status has no significant effect on wage for either men or women. This is
not surprising, as Migrant is only included in the regressions where Minority is also
included, and these two variables also canceled out each other’s effects in the regression
on probability of informal work. We would expect migrants to have lower wages because
they may have different levels of education, or may be working in more informal work
environments. However, because these factors are also included in the regression, these
effects are likely captured in the significant coefficients of YrsSchool and Informal.
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4. Discussion
4.1 Reverse Causality
Reverse causality is possible with many of the variables included in this
regression. For whether the individual is a head of household, reverse causality is less
likely because this is usually the male or husband of the house, which is determined by
societal norms. For marital status and number of children under 5, it is possible that the
stability and increased income of a formal job increases the probability marriage and
impacts fertility decisions in how many children one can afford to have. It is also possible
that being an informal employee allows more flexibility to care for more children.
Formal or informal employment could also influence education levels in a similar
fashion. On one hand, a formal employee may be incentivized to obtain higher levels of
education to be eligible for higher rates of pay or promotions. Formal employees, earning
more on average, may also be more likely to afford to pay for increased levels of
education, but may also experience higher opportunity costs for taking time off to pursue
education. Someone with a more flexible informal job may have more time to devote to
obtaining higher education, although this explanation is likely less prevalent given the
lower average education of those in the informal sector.
4.2 Omitted Variable Bias
Several potentially causal factors for probability of informal employment are
missing from this analysis. Some of these variables are difficult or impossible to observe
in a household survey or census, such as individual motivation, cultural norms, societal
norms, discrimination, and level of choice involved in employment decisions. This study
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omits several observable variables that could influence informal work, such as languages
spoken, experience, and spousal and children’s wages. This model also does not discern
between those who are part-time workers, and those that are full-time. For this reason,
this model does not account for all possible influencing factors on propensity to be
informally employed and income.
Additionally, the large coefficients on the fixed effects for province and country
suggest that there are omitted variables that influence the labor market and employment
trends in specific areas. Some examples of potential missing variables are number of
companies in area, gross income of area, urban or rural status, or even weather.
4.3 Bias within the Sample
For regressions that included the variables Minority and Migrant, the sample size
became more restricted as the regression became limited to only those individuals who
had values for those variables, with Minority being available only in the ENHA and
Migrant only available in 4th trimester data from the ENHA, together creating a much
smaller sample. However, this smaller sample was still collected at random, suggesting
that there is no selection bias.
It is possible that the metrics Informal and Income are biased due to
underreporting. Informal workers that are engaging in illegal and/or “under-the-table”
work may be incentivized to report themselves as labor force non-participants or zeroincome workers to survey authorities to avoid taxes or legal repercussions, which would
bias the proportion and income of informal employees downward.
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Income data from the ENHA was extremely variable and regressions on income
were found to be heteroskedastic. The returns on income from increased education were
found to be negative, which is likely not representative of the actual impacts of education
on income. This could be due to underreporting by those looking to avoid taxes in the
informal sector, by overreporting in the formal or informal sectors of those who want to
appear more successful or include other family members’ incomes in their report, or
misestimation of income by both formal and informal sector employees.
4.4 Minority, Migrant, and Loss of Significance
With Minority and Migrant, initial regression analysis may at first suggest that
neither variable is actually significant, as significance appears to disappear once the other
variable is controlled for. However, the reduction in sample size is assumed to be much,
if not most, of the reason why the significance of migrant status disappears, as its
significance also disappears when the sample size is restricted but minority status is not
included in the regression.9 Because of this, the regressions within the less restricted
sample sizes are presumed to have a better explanation of the relationships between
minorities, migrants, gender, and informal work. Minorities and migrants have been
shown to have a higher likelihood of being employed in the informal sector in the
literature (Portes et. al. 1986; Cantu, 2017), so it would be surprising to find no
significant effect of these qualities in any of the regressions.
For minorities, this study showed evidence of women having a higher likelihood
of employment in the informal sector if they were non-white. As mentioned earlier, being

9

Results of the regression with Migrant on the restricted sample are shown in Appendix Table 8.
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non-white may exacerbate attitudes of “inferiority” that formal employers display
towards women looking to enter the formal sector, or this may also interact with lower
levels of education that minority women tend to have to prevent them from entering
higher-skill formal sectors of employment.
It is possible that the effect of being a migrant is heterogeneous between
Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina is known for being “an immigrant receiver” and the
main destination for migrants from other South American nations (Berg et. al., 2006).
The significance of Migrant and the corresponding interaction term Female*Migrant may
reflect an effect that is present in Argentina, which makes up the majority of the larger
sample that the interaction term is regressed in. Once Minority is included in the
regression, the sample is then only restricted to those in Uruguay, and the effect may
simply be less present in that country, especially if there is less of a pervasive presence of
migrants. Although the “migrant” question was only asked of a small portion of the
respondents in the ENHA, the proportion of migrants of the respondents is much smaller
than the proportion of migrants in the NPHDC, at only 1.86% compared to 4.23%.
If Minority and Migrant in themselves have no significant impact on probability
of being informally employed, this is likely because being a member of these groups is
conflated with other qualities that predict probability of being informally employed, such
as low educational attainment or other omitted variables.
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5. Conclusion
The goal of this study was to observe the interaction effects between gender and
number of children under 5, education, minority status, and migrant status on the
probability of being informally employed and personal income to determine if there are
heterogeneous effects for men and women. Females are, in themselves, more likely to be
informal sector employees, a finding that supports previous research.
The interaction between gender and number of children under 5 showed evidence
of an effect of the number of children under 5 on men, but not for women in being
informally employed. For males, each additional child under 5 lowered the probability of
informal employment by 2.4 percentage points, while each additional child had no effect
in the female-only regressions and the interaction term with gender virtually canceled out
the effect for males. This suggests that men have the option to seek more stable
employment in the formal sector with the addition of young children, but women with
young children face similar barriers to entering the formal sector as women without
young children and are unable to move sectors as a response.
For the interaction between gender and education, females were found to have a
greater effect of a one-year increase in schooling on lessening their probability of being
informally employed. From the informal regression (11), the effect of one year of
additional schooling had an additional effect of 2.3 percentage points on decreasing the
probability of informal employment for women compared to men. This result supports
the hypothesis that there are greater educational barriers for women entering the formal
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sector, but also provides evidence that schooling can have a large impact on expanding
women’s employment opportunities.
Minority women also had a significantly higher propensity to be employed in the
informal sector, while being a minority had an insignificant or weakly significant
negative effect on informal employment for men. Being a non-white increased the
probability of a woman being employed in the informal sector by 3.8 percentage points,
suggesting that race and negative prejudice against non-whites may conflate with existing
barriers to women looking to enter the informal sector.
Migrant women have a 14-15 percentage point increase in their probability of
being an informal sector employee, compared to migrant men, who have only a 2
percentage point increase in their probability of working in the informal sector. This is
evidence of the gendered structure in Latin America—women often migrate instead of
men for opportunities—and indicative of the demand for migrant women in private
household services, the most common sector of employment for female informal
workers. While this sector may be providing women from other countries the chance to
find better work opportunities than they have at home, it may be one of the only options
for them once they arrive, as language, discriminatory, and legal barriers compound with
existing barriers for females to create significant difficulties to moving into the formal
sector.
In the evidence from the regressions on wage, employment in the informal sector
results in significantly lower wages, even when controlling for other factors. Women in
the informal sector still receive a negative penalty on their wages, but less so than men.
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This may suggest that men have an increased monetary incentive to move away from the
informal sector, which may be enabled by the nature of the formal sectors that hire men,
like manufacturing, and their lesser barriers for entry.
The interaction of female on number of children under 5 had an additional
negative penalty to wage, while it had no effect on men, suggesting that more young
children significantly influences the number of hours or level of work that a woman is
able to engage in, but not men. The interactions between female and minority status, as
well as female and migrant status, had no significant impact on wage. Minority status on
its own had a significant negative effect on income, suggesting homogeneous effects for
both women and men.
Both sets of regressions support this notion that there are heterogeneous impacts
of personal characteristics on the propensity to be informally employed for men and
women. Although other fields of study have focused on the intersectionality of women’s
informal employment, economics has tended to sail past further characterization of the
sector and explore more macro-scale questions, such as whether the informal sector is
necessarily one of refuge employment. However, women are a heterogeneous group in
themselves, and a deeper study into the nuance behind women’s informal labor and how
it is impacted by additional factors can help explain the barriers that exist in the formal
labor market, and inform this ongoing conversation about whether the informal sector
employment is really where women and men are “choosing” to work in Latin America.
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6. Appendix
Appendix Table 1
Unpaired t-test results for differences in total and Informal metric samples
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Total N
Informal N
Total
Informal
Difference
Sample
Metric
Mean
Mean
Racial Minority

255,978

92,824

.1259

.1187

Migrant Status

3,690,112

659,692

.0419

.0584

Appendix Table 2
T-test results for differences in age for migrant and native
samples
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLE
Native Mean Migrant Mean Difference

Age

30.633

48.802

-18.169***
(.057)

.0072***
(.0013)
-.0165***
(.0003)
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Appendix Table 3

VARIABLES

Uruguay
Age
Female
Number of
Children under 5
Married
Consensual
Union
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH

Dependent variable: Informal=1, both genders
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Country
Province
Minority
Migrant
Control
Control
Included
Included
0.104***
(0.00183)
0.00176***
(5.36e-05)
0.141***
(0.00129)
-0.0138***

0.00195***
(5.34e-05)
0.143***
(0.00128)
-0.0173***

0.00424***
(0.000138)
0.0807***
(0.00355)
-0.00172

0.00159***
(5.67e-05)
0.148***
(0.00135)
-0.0188***

0.00484***
(0.000274)
0.0774***
(0.00704)
-0.0145**

(0.00104)
-0.0470***
(0.00139)
-0.0550***

(0.00104)
-0.0482***
(0.00138)
-0.0512***

(0.00342)
-0.0301***
(0.00435)
-0.0377***

(0.00108)
-0.0478***
(0.00144)
-0.0591***

(0.00694)
-0.0297***
(0.00869)
-0.0404***

(0.00402)
-0.0170***
(0.00366)
-0.0422***
(0.00318)
0.000204
(0.00382)
-0.0386***
(0.000145)
-0.0416***
(0.00138)

(0.00400)
-0.0167***
(0.00364)
-0.0370***
(0.00316)
0.000983
(0.00379)
-0.0360***
(0.000149)
-0.0398***
(0.00137)

(0.00485)

(0.00772)
-0.0147***
(0.00366)
-0.0359***
(0.00338)
0.00419
(0.00399)
-0.0358***
(0.000156)
-0.0412***
(0.00144)

(0.00961)

Minority

-0.0157**
(0.00789)
-0.00109
(0.0106)
-0.0352***
(0.000453)
-0.0358***
(0.00380)
0.00442
(0.00466)

Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(5)
Minority &
Migrant

0.791***
(0.00252)
729,091
0.126

0.691***
(0.00327)

0.684***
(0.00757)

729,091
92,819
0.139
0.133
Standard errors in parentheses

0.0771***
(0.00250)
0.689***
(0.00341)

-0.0275*
(0.0157)
-0.0158
(0.0209)
-0.0345***
(0.000915)
-0.0383***
(0.00756)
0.00287
(0.00926)
0.0361*
(0.0214)
0.663***
(0.0151)

659,690
0.135

23,732
0.132

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Column 1 uses “country” for location, while Columns 2-5 use “province” indicators.
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Appendix Table 4

VARIABLES

Age
Number of Children
under 5
Married
Consensual Union
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH

Dependent variable: Informal=1, Males
(1)
(2)
(3)
Without
Minority
Migrant Included
Included
0.00280***
(6.92e-05)
-0.0136***

0.00510***
(0.000182)
-0.00147

0.00248***
(7.35e-05)
-0.0150***

0.00562***
(0.000362)
-0.0139

(0.00129)
-0.0767***
(0.00192)
-0.0735***
(0.00518)
-0.0600***
(0.00541)
-0.0396***
(0.00464)
-0.0489***
(0.00682)
-0.0267***
(0.000195)
-0.0415***
(0.00194)

(0.00449)
-0.0745***
(0.00658)
-0.0703***
(0.00693)

(0.00133)
-0.0758***
(0.00199)
-0.0835***
(0.00994)
-0.0571***
(0.00544)
-0.0418***
(0.00492)
-0.0503***
(0.00715)
-0.0266***
(0.000203)
-0.0442***
(0.00202)

(0.00914)
-0.0710***
(0.0132)
-0.0745***
(0.0138)

Minority

-0.0150
(0.0124)
-0.0210
(0.0199)
-0.0272***
(0.000616)
-0.0154***
(0.00588)
-0.00167
(0.00617)

Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(4)
Minority &
Migrant

0.603***
(0.00422)

0.600***
(0.00975)

0.0206***
(0.00341)
0.613***
(0.00438)

454,711
55,450
413,204
0.092
0.103
0.081
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0290
(0.0252)
-0.0502
(0.0399)
-0.0269***
(0.00125)
-0.0186
(0.0117)
0.00165
(0.0122)
0.0323
(0.0298)
0.582***
(0.0194)
14,132
0.106
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Appendix Table 5

VARIABLES

Age
Number of Children
under 5
Married
Consensual Union
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH

Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females
(1)
(2)
(3)
Without
Minority
Migrant Included
Included
0.000168**
(8.28e-05)
-0.0151***

0.00271***
(0.000212)
0.00416

-0.000196**
(8.77e-05)
-0.0170***

0.00341***
(0.000421)
-0.00906

(0.00180)
-0.00322
(0.00211)
-0.0283***
(0.00624)
0.00550
(0.00476)
-0.0279***
(0.00419)
0.0173***
(0.00454)
-0.0509***
(0.000227)
-0.0135***
(0.00225)

(0.00525)
0.0102
(0.00642)
-0.00672
(0.00734)

(0.00188)
-0.00367*
(0.00220)
-0.0322***
(0.0120)
0.00668
(0.00479)
-0.0266***
(0.00450)
0.0196***
(0.00477)
-0.0504***
(0.000239)
-0.0123***
(0.00237)

(0.0107)
0.00684
(0.0128)
-0.00558
(0.0146)

Minority

-0.00802
(0.0101)
0.0183
(0.0126)
-0.0460***
(0.000659)
-0.0219***
(0.00618)
0.0144**
(0.00703)

Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(4)
Minority &
Migrant

1.009***
(0.00502)

0.893***
(0.0119)

0.141***
(0.00356)
0.994***
(0.00529)

274,380
37,369
246,486
0.211
0.189
0.216
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0168
(0.0199)
0.00794
(0.0249)
-0.0448***
(0.00133)
-0.0275**
(0.0123)
0.00338
(0.0140)
0.0315
(0.0301)
0.864***
(0.0241)
9,600
0.182
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Appendix Table 6

VARIABLES

Age
Female
Children under 5
Married
Consensual Union
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH
Female*Children
under 5

Dependent Variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions
(1)
(2)
(3)
Children
Education
Minority
Interaction
Interaction
Interaction
0.00194***
(5.34e-05)
0.139***
(0.00135)
-0.0240***
(0.00122)
-0.0485***
(0.00138)
-0.0512***
(0.00400)
-0.0171***
(0.00364)
-0.0370***
(0.00316)
0.00165
(0.00379)
-0.0360***
(0.000149)
-0.0381***
(0.00138)
0.0227***

0.00185***
(5.32e-05)
0.368***
(0.00306)
-0.0164***
(0.00104)
-0.0514***
(0.00138)
-0.0524***
(0.00398)
-0.0255***
(0.00362)
-0.0392***
(0.00315)
-0.0218***
(0.00379)
-0.0271***
(0.000184)
-0.0379***
(0.00137)

0.00424***
(0.000138)
0.0759***
(0.00374)
-0.00174
(0.00342)
-0.0299***
(0.00435)
-0.0373***
(0.00485)

-0.0154*
(0.00789)
-0.000661
(0.0106)
-0.0352***
(0.000453)
-0.0366***
(0.00381)

(4)
Migrant
Interaction
0.00163***
(5.67e-05)
0.140***
(0.00138)
-0.0187***
(0.00108)
-0.0479***
(0.00144)
-0.0593***
(0.00771)
-0.0155***
(0.00366)
-0.0359***
(0.00337)
0.00314
(0.00399)
-0.0356***
(0.000156)
-0.0407***
(0.00144)

(0.00216)
Female*Yrs

-0.0229***
(0.000283)

Minority

-0.0106*
(0.00593)
0.0382***
(0.00931)

Female*Minority
Migrant
Female*Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.693***
(0.00327)

0.613***
(0.00339)

0.686***
(0.00758)

729,091
729,091
92,819
0.139
0.147
0.133
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0211***
(0.00330)
0.128***
(0.00493)
0.688***
(0.00341)
659,690
0.135
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Appendix Table 7

VARIABLES

Children Under 5
Yrs of School
Minority
Migrant
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females
(1)
(2)
(3)
Without
With Minority
With Migrant
Minority &
Migrant
0.00443
0.00416
-0.00903
(0.00524)
(0.00525)
(0.0107)
-0.0462***
-0.0460***
-0.0448***
(0.000654)
(0.000659)
(0.00132)
0.0144**
(0.00703)
0.0316
(0.0301)
0.898***
0.893***
0.865***
(0.0118)
(0.0119)
(0.0237)
37,369
37,369
9,600
0.189
0.189
0.182
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
With Minority
& Migrant
-0.00906
(0.0107)
-0.0448***
(0.00133)
0.00338
(0.0140)
0.0315
(0.0301)
0.864***
(0.0241)
9,600
0.182

*The table above shows the female informality regressions only on individuals that have
a value for Minority to show the effects of running the regressions on just the smaller
sample. This sample includes only respondents from Uruguay. In this smaller sample,
Minority is significant on its own at the 5% level, Migrant is not significant on its own,
and neither are significant when included together in the sample. In the larger sample
(Table 6 in body), Minority is significant at the 10% level when included on its own,
Migrant is significant at the 1% level when on its own, yet neither are significant when
included together.
Migrant is much more significant in the larger sample, which is the sample that also
includes Argentina. The reason why the sample is so small for the migration metric in
Uruguay is that the migration questions were only asked in the fourth trimester of the
survey. Data was still collected at random and have respondents from all localities, but it
is a far smaller sample of respondents. Because the sample decreases so greatly and
Migrant is not significant in the small sample at all, it is inferred that the loss of
significance when both minority and migration status are controlled for is partially caused
by this drop in sample size.
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Appendix Table 8
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
N5 & Yrs Only
Migrant
Migrant &
(Whole Metric
Included
Minority
Sample)
Included
Female
Children under 5
Yrs of School
Female*N5
Female*Yrs

0.363***
(0.00308)
-0.0235***
(0.00121)
-0.0272***
(0.000184)
0.0241***
(0.00215)
-0.0229***
(0.000283)

0.371***
(0.00330)
-0.0243***
(0.00125)
-0.0266***
(0.000192)
0.0228***
(0.00225)
-0.0237***
(0.000297)
0.0256***
(0.00329)
0.108***
(0.00491)

0.615***
(0.00339)

0.611***
(0.00354)

Migrant
Female*Migrant
Minority
Female*Minority
Constant

Observations
R-squared

729,091
659,690
0.147
0.144
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.213***
(0.0171)
-0.0264***
(0.00850)
-0.0275***
(0.00118)
0.0339***
(0.0131)
-0.0162***
(0.00173)
0.0348
(0.0289)
-0.00650
(0.0427)
7.67e-05
(0.0118)
0.00501
(0.0186)
0.606***
(0.0163)
23,732
0.136

*The table above shows the regressions with multiple interaction variables on the
probability of being an informal worker, in order of restricting sample size. The first
regression contains the sample without Minority or Migrant, the second contains
Minority, and the third contains both Migrant and Minority. In this regression, both
Female*N5 and Female*Yrs interactions remain significant in all regressions, and their
magnitude remains relatively similar, with the same signs. However, Female*Migrant is
no longer significant once Minority is controlled for. Based on the sample size of those
that include both Minority and Migrant and the fact that it only represents a small portion
of the entire Uruguay sample, it is likely that this significance of Migrant and
Female*Migrant becomes no longer significant due to this change in the sample size.
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Appendix Table 9
Dependent variable: Informal=1
(1)
VARIABLES
Interactions
with Education
and Minority
Age
Female
Number of
Children under 5
Married
Consensual Union
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH
Female*Yrs
Minority
Female*Minority
Constant

0.00427***
(0.000138)
0.225***
(0.00852)
-0.000522
(0.00341)
-0.0342***
(0.00435)
-0.0401***
(0.00484)
-0.0199**
(0.00788)
-0.0175*
(0.0106)
-0.0280***
(0.000584)
-0.0326***
(0.00380)
-0.0169***
(0.000863)
-0.00363
(0.00593)
0.0204**
(0.00934)
0.625***
(0.00819)

Observations
92,819
R-squared
0.137
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*This table reports the result of a regression on Informal with the inclusion of
Female*Minority, Minority, and Female*YrsSchool. It shows that Minority no longer is
significant, but Female*Minority remains significant at the 5% level when
Female*YrsSchool is controlled for.
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Appendix Table 10
Dependent variable: Informal=1
(1)
VARIABLES
All Variables
and Interactions
Age
Female
Children Under 5
Married
Consensual Union
Divorced
Widowed
Yrs of School
Head of HH
Female*N5
Female*Yrs
Migrant
Female*Migrant
Minority
Female*Minority
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.00483***
(0.000274)
0.213***
(0.0171)
-0.0264***
(0.00850)
-0.0324***
(0.00869)
-0.0403***
(0.00962)
-0.0300*
(0.0157)
-0.0312
(0.0210)
-0.0275***
(0.00118)
-0.0332***
(0.00760)
0.0339***
(0.0131)
-0.0162***
(0.00173)
0.0348
(0.0289)
-0.00650
(0.0427)
7.67e-05
(0.0118)
0.00501
(0.0186)
0.606***
(0.0163)
23,732
0.136

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

*The table above shows the results of the regressions on Informal when all of the
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interaction variables are included together. The interactions Female*Children Under 5
and Female*Yrs of School remain significant, while Female*Minority and
Female*Migrant are no longer significant. This reduction in significance is likely related
to the decrease in sample size, as other tables in this Appendix show a reduction in
significance on Minority when sample is restricted, but Migrant is not controlled for.

